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Collaborative processes for working toward common management goals between individuals and 
organizations, despite their differences, emerged as one enduring legacy resulting from the Timber 
Wars in the American West during the late-1980s and the early 1990s. Power imbalances are often 
cited as a common problem in collaborative processes and can have a lasting, deleterious impact 
on the collaborative process and its outcomes. For all its importance, however, there is a yet un-
fulfilled need to understand the extent to which power and power imbalances affect collaborative 
relationships. Our research uses a case study approach to qualitatively analyze power dynamics 
within three collaborative efforts comprised of the United States Forest Service and community 
stakeholders. We identified four sources of power in play within the three case studies examined 
to include authority, resources, discursive legitimacy, and trust. We also discuss the application 
of these power sources and the ensuing outcomes. These powers, and the imbalance that sometimes 
result from their application, are representative of some of the underlying tensions that can be 
present in collaborative processes.  
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he Timber Wars in the 
American West during the 
late-1980s and the early 
1990s left in their wake 
many enduring legacies in-
cluding the emergence of collaborative pro-
cesses among individuals and organizations 
who work towards common management 
goals, despite their differences (Baker and 
Kusel 2003). While this emergent form of so-
cial relations has attracted attention from pol-
icy-makers, federal forest stakeholders, and 
researchers, power imbalances are cited as a 
common problem in collaborative govern-
ance arrangements and can have a lasting, 
deleterious impact on the collaborative pro-
cess and its outcomes (Gray 1989). Power 
imbalances can occur as the result of stronger 
parties manipulating other parties within the 
collaboration. Government agencies are often 
in the position to invite community stake-
holders into the collaborative process while, 
at the same time, being actors in the process 
themselves. This leads to concerns that 
agency personnel may opt to dominate the 
process by including or excluding certain 
stakeholders. This dominating behavior may 
also be exhibited by non-governmental mem-
bers of the collaboration (Lukes 1975; Sin-
gleton 2002; Walker and Hurley 2004). Ad-
ditionally, if stakeholders, including agen-
cies, do not have power in terms of voice, re-
sources, or legitimacy, they risk being co-
opted by more powerful stakeholders within 
the collaborative arrangement (Coggins 
1999; McCloskey 1996; Purdy 2012).  
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 For all its importance, however, there 
is a yet unfulfilled need to understand the ex-
tent to which power and power imbalances 
affect collaborative relationships (Cook 
2015; Purdy 2012). Despite the integral role 
that power-sharing plays in collaborative 
governance, relatively few empirical studies 
have been dedicated to understanding the role 
of power in natural resource management at 
the field level (Raik, Wilson and Decker 
2008). Our study contributes to the empirical 
analysis of the role of power in collaborative 
governance arrangements by examining the 
attributes of power at play in three case stud-
ies of collaborative national forest manage-
ment processes involving the US Department 
of Agriculture’s Forest Service (USFS) and 
locally-based stakeholders. In this study, we 
used three research questions to guide our in-
quiry:  1) What are the sources of power at 
play in the USFS – community collaboration 
interactions? 2) How is power being applied 
in the USFS – community collaboration in-
teractions? 3) What are the outcomes of the 
application of power and what are the conse-
quences for the USFS’s organizational struc-
tures and processes? 
 
Background 
 
The Promise of Collaborative Governance 
 
Over the past three decades, collaborative 
governance has come to the fore as a way to 
address natural resource management prob-
lems that are often complex and contentious 
(Cestero 1999; Dukes 2001; Scardina, Morti-
mer and Dudley 2007; Singleton 2002). 
These collaborative efforts have been created 
in response to the inability of any single en-
tity to address the interconnected ecological, 
economic, and social complexities arising 
from resource management and as a method 
of answering the public’s demand to be more 
involved in making decisions about the man-
agement activities on public lands.  Addition-
ally, as budgets are stretched and human re-
sources constrained in natural resource man-
agement agencies, collaborative governance 
arrangements have been touted as an im-
portant avenue for getting on-the-ground-
work completed, particularly in the areas of 
forest planning and forest restoration (Carr, 
Selin and Schuett 1998; Cheng and Burns 
2007; Leach, Pelkey and Sabatier 2002; Selin 
and Chevez 1995; Selin, Schuett and Carr 
1997). Collaboration with community 
groups, particularly in the western United 
States, has also proliferated as a way to ad-
dress threats to life, property, and infrastruc-
ture from wildfires (Jakes et al. 2011). As our 
unit of study in this research, we examine 
three collaborative groups, composed of the 
United States Forest Service and community 
stakeholders, formed for the purpose of en-
hancing forest restoration activities.  
   
Power Defined 
  
Robert Dahl (1957) in his seminal work, The 
Concept of Power notes that most people 
have an intuitive sense of what power means, 
yet scientists have struggled to articulate its 
precise meaning. A review of the social sci-
ence and collaborative governance literature 
proves that a mutual definition remains elu-
sive (Cook 2015; Shively 2011; Gerlak, 
Heikkila and Lubell et al. 2013). Kanter 
(1992:46) writes that power “is a function of 
formal authority, resources controlled, and 
contingencies managed.” Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999) define power as the authority to create 
rules and make decisions. Egan, Hjerpe and 
Abrams (2011) refer to three phases of 
power; the ability to control the behavior of 
others or the ‘power over,’ the ability to au-
thorize the participation of stakeholders who 
might otherwise be marginalized or the 
‘power for,’ and the ‘power to’ which he de-
fines as the ability to measure another entity’s 
ability to realize its goals. In its simplest 
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form, power refers to the influence one per-
son or group has over the other (Weber 
1922). We apply Weber’s (1922) definition 
here to collaborative governance. As such, 
power can be thought of as the desire and 
ability of a subset of the members of a collab-
orative group to influence the decision made 
on behalf of the group as a whole. 
 
Power in Collaborative Governance    
 
Collaboration, by its very nature and defini-
tion, involves some level of shared power 
(Armitage 2005). However, if power is not 
shared equally among all collaborative group 
members, it has the ability to prevent equita-
ble relationships from emerging or transform 
symmetrical collaborative networks into 
asymmetrical decision-making bodies with 
the potential to further strain already tenuous 
relationships. The distribution of power 
across actors involved in collaboration can 
affect how problems in resource management 
are defined and solutions are ultimately im-
plemented (Sturtevant and Donoghue 2008). 
Despite its critical importance, analyzing 
power in collaborative processes is challeng-
ing, not only because of its inherent complex-
ity, but as Purdy (2012:410) states, “because 
they [collaborative processes] are ambigu-
ous, complex contexts in which participants, 
social structures, and processes can change 
rapidly.” In this study, we examine power 
and ensuing power dynamics through the ex-
amination of three observable attributes that 
constitutes power: the sources of power, the 
application of power, and the consequences 
and outcomes resulting from the application 
of power.  
 
Sources of Power  
 
We borrow from Purdy (2012), three sources 
of power within collaborative governance 
processes; authority, resources, and discur-
sive legitimacy, and include a fourth source, 
trust, into our analysis.  
 Congress confers broad authority di-
rectly to the USFS through the agency’s stat-
utory mission and mandates, along with sub-
stantive and procedural limitations to that 
power (Coggins 1999; Nie 2004). On the one 
hand, these congressional mandates are 
vague, thereby vesting USFS administrators 
with a high degree of discretion over major 
decisions, from rulemaking to project-level 
decision-making. On the other hand, these 
same mandates provide substantive opportu-
nities for public participation in agency deci-
sion processes. Stakeholders often seek to 
limit an agency’s authority and discretion by 
imposing their values and views on the deci-
sion-making process; agencies must then ne-
gotiate their discretionary authority with 
stakeholders, effectively defining their ‘deci-
sion space,’ which, over time, can lead to an 
imbalance of power between agency and 
community stakeholders (Coggins 1999; Nie 
2004). The public also gains authoritative 
power through litigation and administrative 
appeals. 
 Resource-based power is recognized 
when those organizations that hold important 
and valuable resources wield that power to 
their advantage (Purdy 2012). As Purdy 
(2012:410) states, resources can include such 
tangibles as: “financial resources, people, 
technology, and supplies; and intangibles 
such as knowledge, culture, and capabilities.” 
Expertise, knowledge and information are in-
timately linked, where the resource-based 
power of expertise lies in the accumulation 
and acquisition of a specific body of 
knowledge through formal academic training 
or job experience (Greiner and Schein 1988).  
Weber’s (1958) classic research suggests that 
the element of expertise is indeed, the bureau-
cracy’s primary source of power. It is im-
portant to note, however, that these resources, 
and the power they connote, are not limited 
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to the agency; other parties within the collab-
orative group can bring these resources to the 
table and use them to assert their power (Gray 
1985). 
 Discursive legitimacy refers to a 
source of power that can be amassed when an 
organization has the ability to speak on behalf 
of the public it serves and advances a public 
discourse on issues of importance and man-
ages the meaning related to the issues (Hardy 
and Phillips 1998). Purdy (2012:411) writes, 
“Organizations exercise discursive legiti-
macy when they act on behalf of the values 
or norms of society, such as the rule of law, 
the logic of economic rationality, or princi-
ples such as democracy or respect for diverse 
cultures. An organization with discursive le-
gitimacy draws its power from the status of 
the values or logic it represents.”  
 Trust is an often overlooked source of 
power in the collaborative governance litera-
ture as it is most often intertwined with other 
power sources; however, trust is at the foun-
dation of many public natural resource plan-
ning processes and is a key determinant in 
shaping planning outcomes (Lachapelle, 
McCool and Patterson 2003). It stands to rea-
son that community-agency relations would 
be heavily based on trust, especially when ne-
gotiating the collaborative decision-space; 
per Nie’s (2004) analysis, agencies which en-
joy a high level of trust on the part of public 
stakeholders are more likely to be granted a 
greater degree of discretion. Smith et al. 
(2012) describe four dimensions of trust in-
volved in community-agency relations: 1) 
dispositional trust; 2) trust in the federal gov-
ernment; 3) shared values; and 4) moral and 
technical competencies. Dispositional trust 
refers to an individual’s propensity to trust or 
distrust others. Smith et al. (2013:454) com-
ment that dispositional trust is generally a sta-
ble personality characteristic attributable to 
“early-life social interactions.” Trust in the 
federal government stems from an individ-
ual’s “level of confidence in the ability of the 
federal government to carry out its fiduciary 
responsibilities” (Smith et al. 2013:454) and 
this level of confidence translates to the level 
of trust an individual extends to a manage-
ment agency. A belief that a resource man-
agement agency shares an individual’s values 
and holds the same perspectives, opinions, 
and desired outcomes of resource manage-
ment portends that individual’s trust in the 
agency. Finally, the trust that an agency will 
do what it is expected and obligated to do re-
lies on several factors relating to moral and 
technical competencies. Smith et al. 
(2013:455) suggest that for trust to exist in 
the agency-community relationship, “there 
must be some expectation on the part of the 
trustor (e.g., local community member) that 
the trustee (e.g. management agency) will ad-
here to moral codes, show respect for the 
trustor’s values, and be technically capable 
and able to perform specific tasks that yield 
benefits for the trustor.”  
 
Application of Power 
 
Purdy (2012) provides a framework for as-
sessing power in collaborative governance 
processes by examining how three sources of 
power – authority, resources, and discursive 
legitimacy – are applied in three separate are-
nas: the participation arena, the process de-
sign arena, and the content arena. The partic-
ipant arena considers who the participants 
and leaders will be in the collaboration pro-
cess. Purdy (2012:411) notes that participants 
need to include those “with formal power to 
make a decision, those affected by a decision, 
and those with relevant information or exper-
tise.” Those who possess the power of au-
thority can apply their power by determining 
who will be invited to participate in the col-
laboration process and what range of interests 
the participants represent. The power of re-
sources, when applied in the participation 
arena, can influence how deeply participants 
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engage in the collaborative process by influ-
encing the number of people to be involved 
and level of information and expertise 
brought to the collaboration. Discursive legit-
imacy is applied when judgment is passed re-
garding who deserves to be involved in the 
collaboration and who can be trusted to fol-
low through on commitments made on behalf 
of the organizations that the participants rep-
resent (Purdy 2012).  
The second arena in which power can 
be applied, according to Purdy (2012), is the 
process design arena. Process design occurs 
prior to the formation of the goals of the col-
laboration and determines the “where, when, 
and how” of the collaborative process 
(2012:411). Purdy (2012), following Straus 
(2002), stresses that the process design must 
be adaptable to allow for trial and error as the 
collaborative process proceeds. Authority is 
applied when participants feel they ‘own’ the 
process and have a right to impose their ex-
pectations about how the process will unfold 
and the degree to which other participants 
will be active during deliberations and nego-
tiations. The availability of resources has the 
ability to shape the collaborative process by 
facilitating or limiting factors such as meet-
ing location and frequency, access to technol-
ogy, and other costs associated with meeting 
hosting and attendance. Those holding the 
greater amount of power derived from discur-
sive legitimacy “can lead to domineering be-
havior and one-way flows of information” 
(Purdy 2012:411). Discursive legitimacy can 
also be applied as a gatekeeping function and 
can aid in determining the status of other par-
ticipants and how and with whom the collab-
orative process is discussed (Purdy 2012).  
 The final arena in which Purdy (2012) 
suggests that power is applied is the content 
arena. Applying power in this arena deter-
mines the issues that the collaborative effort 
will address, and which desired outcomes 
will be pursued. As Purdy (2012:412) writes, 
“authority allows an organization to set the 
agenda and establish other participants’ ex-
pectation regarding the outcome of the pro-
cess.” The participants who hold the power of 
resources have the ability to control avenues 
of communication such as meeting documen-
tation, which, in turn, as Purdy (2012) sug-
gests, might influence future meetings. Dis-
cursive legitimacy is applied in the content 
arena when participants attempt to influence 
the prioritization of issues and how those is-
sues are framed (Purdy 2012).  
 
The Consequences and Outcomes of the Ap-
plication of Power 
 
For all its promise of beneficial outcomes, 
collaborative governance is not without its 
pitfalls. Purdy (2012:409) notes that many of 
the pitfalls of collaboration can be “linked to 
power disparities among participating organ-
izations and how power affects such issues as 
representation, participation, and voice.” A 
review of the collaborative governance liter-
ature indeed shows that a jockeying for 
power is common in collaboration processes 
(Gray 1989; Short and Winter 1999; Suss-
kind and Cruikshank 1987; Tett, Crowther 
and O'Hara 2003). Inconsistent expectations 
of the collaborative process and lack of com-
mitment of necessary resources have been la-
beled as obstacles that can impede, if not de-
rail, collaborative efforts (Moote and Becker 
2003; Walker and Hurley 2004). Critical in-
terests may not be adequately represented 
(Leach 2006) and negotiations that seek to 
balance private interests with public authority 
are not always successful (Walker and Hur-
ley 2004). Power differences between the 
parties can heighten conflict and often result 
in a depletion of human resources as well as 
the potential to harm the very resources 
which the collaboration was trying to protect 
(Buckles and Rusnak 1999). A lack of trust 
between agencies and stakeholders (Daven-
port, Leahy, Anderson et al. 2007; Leach 
2006; Schuett, Selin and Carr 2001) and an 
195
POWER IN FOREST COLLABORATIVES 
unwillingness to compromise on strongly 
held, value-based positions often result in dif-
ficult and sometimes unsuccessful collabora-
tive efforts (Donoghue and Sturtevant 2008). 
At its best, power can be used to level the 
playing field, giving all participants of a col-
laborative group equal representation (Purdy 
2012). At its worst, power imbalances can 
create scenarios in which the more powerful 
stakeholders can co-opt the process and in 
some cases “capture” the agency with whom 
they are collaborating (Seidenfeld 2000; Sin-
gleton 2000).  
 Despite collaboration’s importance 
and proliferation, there is a need for more re-
search on the role of power in those processes 
(Cook 2015). This gap in the collaborative 
literature is especially troublesome in the 
face of the potential deleterious conse-
quences such as co-option and agency cap-
ture (Ansell and Gash 2008; Cook 2015; Im-
perial 2005; Purdy 2012). This study aims to 
address this gap in the literature.  
  
Methods 
 
Case Study Approach 
 
Three case studies encompassing the USFS 
and community collaborative efforts were se-
lected as units of study. The three collabora-
tive groups were selected because they were 
similar in purpose, with each group working 
with their respective national forests on forest 
restoration issues in the aftermath of timber 
management conflicts (Table 1). The focus 
was on the ranger district and supervisor of-
fice levels of the USFS in each case study. To 
protect the anonymity of interviewees, we 
use pseudonyms for each of the collaborative 
groups and the national forests. The three 
case studies that were chosen as units of anal-
ysis were: 1) The Northmont Forest Restora-
tion Coalition (NFRC) – USFS Region 6; 2) 
The Lone Mountain Forest Restoration Col-
laborative (LMFRC) – USFS Region 4; and 
3) The Meadow Valley Forest Collaborative 
(MVFC) – USFS Region 2.   
 The NFRC collaborates with the Bear 
Valley National Forest (Bear Valley) in the 
northwest region of the United States and is 
the oldest collaborative effort among the 
three case studies. The community in which 
the ranger district and supervisor offices un-
der study reside has a population of just be-
low 5,000 people and most employment in 
the area relies on the timber, agriculture and 
mining industries, along with state and na-
tional government offices. The timber indus-
try in the area has experienced dramatic 
changes in production from federal forests, 
and the region figured prominently in the 
Timber Wars; the relationship between the 
timber industry and environmental groups 
has been a contentious one and the area has a 
long history of conflict between the two enti-
ties. The NFRC was founded in 2002 for the 
purposes of ameliorating this conflict and for 
improving forest health through restoration 
practices, protecting the community from 
wildfire, and creating community economic 
viability. At the time of this study, the NFRC 
consisted predominately of representatives 
from the industry and conservation interests. 
In 2003, the NFRC and the Bear Valley for-
malized their working relationship by signing 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). 
While the wounds that came out of the Tim-
ber Wars are still observable today, the 
NFRC and the Bear Valley have collaborated 
on over 25 forest management projects as of 
the date of this research, ranging from stew-
ardship contracting to forest planning. 
The LMFRC was formed in July 2006 
and collaborates with the River Point Na-
tional Forest (River Point) in the intermoun-
tain west region of the United States; it rep-
resents a ‘middle-aged’ case study. The com-
munity in which the USFS offices reside has 
a population of just over 3,000. The area’s 
current economy is based chiefly on ranching 
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with some minor logging and mining opera-
tions. Until the mid-1990s, the area was home 
to several small, locally-owned sawmills, log 
home manufactures, post-and-pole opera-
tions, and commercial firewood businesses 
which provided employment for the commu-
nity’s citizens. Mill closures in the late 1980s  
 
and early 1990s cost the local economy 250 
jobs. Today, the remaining forest product 
businesses lack the capacity to process 
enough timber to make a large contribution to 
the area’s economy. Recreation and tourism 
are now the major contributors to the area’s 
financial resources. Prior to the formation of 
the LMFRC, the River Point was mired in 
gridlock, facing appeals and litigation over 
forest management issues from protecting 
old-growth stands to firewood sales. Today 
the LMFRC is a self-governed group com-
prised of landowners, timber industry repre-
sentatives, retired USFS personnel, the envi-
ronmental community, non-federal govern-
ment entities, and community leaders. The 
LMFRC, through an MOU between the River 
Point and the collaborative group, works to 
restore the forest to a condition that mimics 
the historic range of variability in terms of 
stand structure, composition, and disturbance 
regimes. At the time of this writing, the group 
had completed one major restoration project 
with two more slated as future activities.  
Table 1. Summary of Characteristics of Case Studies 
Group name 
(Pseudonyms) 
USFS 
region 
Group mission/fo-
cus 
Years ac-
tive 
Type of participants Formality of 
agreements with 
the USFS 
Northmont Forest 
Restoration Coali-
tion (NFRC) 
6 Demonstrate the full 
potential of restora-
tion forestry to en-
hance forest health, 
public safety, and 
community eco-
nomic vitality. 
 
2002 - Pre-
sent 
USFS agency representa-
tives, timber industry, en-
vironmental community 
Memorandum of 
Understanding and 
‘Collaborative 
Work Plan’ (a 
pseudonym) 
Lone Mountain 
Forest Restoration 
Collaborative 
(LMFRC) 
4 Enhance forest 
health and local 
economies in the 
county through stew-
ardship contracting 
and restoration activ-
ities 
 
2006 - Pre-
sent 
USFS and other federal 
agency representatives, 
landowners, timber indus-
try, environmental com-
munity, community lead-
ers, non-federal govern-
ment representatives 
 
Memorandum of 
Understanding 
Meadow Valley 
Forest Collabora-
tive (MVFC) 
2 Use collaborative 
approaches to im-
prove the health and 
long-term resilience 
of mixed-conifer for-
ests and the commu-
nities located near 
them. 
2010 - Pre-
sent 
USFS agency representa-
tives, landowners, timber 
industry, environmental 
community, scientists, 
community leaders, 
elected officials, non-fed-
eral government repre-
sentatives 
 
No formal agree-
ment at the time 
data were collected 
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 The MVFC is the most newly formed 
of the collaborative efforts studied, with in-
auguration in the fall of 2010. The MVFC 
works collaboratively with the Sunset Ridge 
National Forest (Sunset) in the Rocky Moun-
tain Region of the United States. The com-
munity in this case study has a population of 
approximately 1,700 people. The area expe-
rienced intensive, albeit short-lived, logging 
between 1890 and 1945. By the 1970s, a 
dwindling supply of large-diameter trees 
spelled the end of major logging operations 
in the area; administrative appeals and citizen 
lawsuits of timber projects hastened the de-
cline of commercial timber harvesting in the 
area. Today, the forest provides recreational 
and aesthetic benefits to the community’s cit-
izens, many of whom have taken an interest 
in forest health issues on the Sunset. The 
MVFC was established to include stakehold-
ers’ perspectives and to collaboratively de-
velop science-based forest management pri-
orities. One of the group’s early successes 
was the award of a long-term stewardship 
contract in June of 2012.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
  
Data were collected between March and Au-
gust 2012 using qualitative social science re-
search methods encompassing semi-struc-
tured individual interviews and participant 
observation of group meetings. Written re-
ports created by the collaborative groups, 
meeting minutes, and official collaboration 
documents, such as MOUs were also col-
lected. The intent of adding these documents 
to the analysis was to enhance the reliability 
of results by data triangulation (Golafshani 
2003). We conducted twenty-six semi-struc-
tured, open-ended interviews across the three 
cases. Of the twenty-six interviews, 16 were 
with agency personnel (staff and line offic-
ers) and 10 were with community stakehold-
ers. Line officers encompass district rangers 
as well as forest supervisors. We chose inter-
view respondents by both purposive and net-
work sampling (Granovetter 1976). A key in-
formant from each stakeholder group was de-
termined based on professional relationships 
with the authors. These key stakeholders 
were contacted and they, in turn, provided a 
list of other group members. Similarly, we 
identified the key USFS contact in each 
group (e.g. line officer, planner, or resource 
specialist) and they provided us with a list of 
potential USFS interviewees. All identified 
persons were contacted via email or tele-
phone. In all three case studies, we timed our 
field visits to coincide with collaborative 
group meetings, which we attended. Inter-
view notes were transcribed verbatim into a 
text format for content analysis and coding. 
Accuracy of interview data was verified by 
sending transcripts to each respective inter-
viewee. Changes were made to the final tran-
scripts based on interviewee comments and 
clarifications.  
 We conducted a content analysis via 
coding and constant comparison for 26 inter-
views and all generated and collected docu-
mentation employing a modified grounded 
theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
We modified the coding process as described 
by grounded theory in that, in addition to 
identifying emergent codes, we developed a 
priori codes based on the sensitizing con-
cepts derived from the literature and structur-
ally-driven codes that were derived from our 
research goals and questions (DeCuir-Gunby, 
Marshall and McCulloch 2011). 
 
Findings 
 
In this section, we present the dominant 
storylines developed from the data, repre-
sented as the sources of power and their ap-
plication and the associated outcomes. Se-
lected quotations from interviewees are pre-
sented. Evidence obtained from documenta-
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tion such as meeting minutes, agreements be-
tween the USFS and the collaborative groups, 
and personal observation notes are also pre-
sented. We use non-identifying means when 
presenting quotations to protect the anonym-
ity of participants. The analysis of the 26 in-
terviews revealed four sources of power in 
play within the three case studies examined: 
1) authority; 2) resources; 3) discursive legit-
imacy; and 4) trust. We use Purdy’s (2012) 
framework for assessing collaborative power, 
with the addition of trust (Smith, Leahy, 
Anderson et al. 2013), to organize our data. 
Below we provide a summary these findings.  
 
Power of Authority 
  
Evidence of the power of authority was found 
in all three cases with the NFRC providing 
the strongest evidence of shifting power dy-
namics with seven of the 10 quotations com-
ing from that group. In the participant arena, 
the LMFRC and the MVFC had representa-
tion from a broad spectrum of interests and 
perspectives and were open to including new 
members. For example, the LMFRC includes 
representatives from: local outfitters, state 
fish and game, timber industry, conservation 
organizations, and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment. The range of stakeholder interests rep-
resented in the NFRC was narrower, involv-
ing only the agency and timber industry and 
conservation organization representatives. 
One line officer from the NFRC spoke about 
the need to include other stakeholders and 
commented, “I think there is an opportunity 
to make this less of an insular collaborative 
group so that there is more representation, 
more voices.”  
 Leadership is also an important mech-
anism for applying the power of authority in 
the participant arena and the application of 
leadership was varied across the three case 
studies. In the MVFC the line officer that 
works with the collaborative group is clear 
about the agency’s role in decision-making 
and claims his leadership authority when 
working with the group. He states,  
 
I chose to be very clear with the [col-
laborative group] that the Forest Ser-
vice is the ultimate decision-maker, 
and that it was not their role to be de-
cision-makers. It was to understand 
how the Forest Service gets to a deci-
sion. 
 
No participants from the LMFRC mentioned 
leadership in the context of the application of 
the power of authority during the interviews, 
however, their MOU clearly defines the lim-
its of the collaborative group by asserting that 
the agency is the ultimate decision-maker. 
The MOU states, “the USFS shall: Make all 
decisions or determinations for National For-
est Systems lands.” 
 In stark contrast to the LMFRC and 
the MVFC, six interviewees from the NFRC 
made comments that suggest the USFS line 
officers were relinquishing some authority to 
the collaborative group. The way leadership 
was applied had consequences in the process 
arena where some participants felt that they 
had the right to impose their expectations on 
the group as a whole.  It was not uncommon 
for USFS participants to use language such 
as, “the [collaborative group] are always say-
ing things like we will ‘allow’ you to do this 
or that.”  
 In the content arena, the analysis of 
the NFRC yielded evidence that the non-
agency members of the collaborative group 
were defining the group’s agenda and expec-
tations of outcomes through the group’s Col-
laborative Agreement Acceptance Frame-
work – a pseudonym (CAAF) for collabora-
tive action. The CAAF details what the 
NFRC calls a ‘holistic management strategy’ 
and was first drafted through a multi-stake-
holder processes with foresters, scientists, 
conservation groups, USFS, the state depart-
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ment of natural resource, and forest practi-
tioners, recreation and tribal interests. De-
spite the fact that the CAAF was developed 
through a multi-stakeholder process, its ap-
plication is for use only by the collaborative 
group members and the USFS. The CAAF 
was in effect during the time of this research 
and was considered by the collaborative 
group, including the USFS, as the basis for 
negotiated decision space in determining for-
est management allocations.  There is an im-
plied understanding between the collabora-
tive group and the USFS that if the guidelines 
of the CAAF are followed, the collaborative 
group will not file objections to those deci-
sions. However, during an informal conver-
sation with one line officer, we were told that 
the collaborative group was planning to file 
an objection to an action that the USFS con-
sidered in alignment with the CAAF. The 
outcome from working with the CAAF was 
expressed by the USFS personnel inter-
viewed as a continuum of responses ranging 
from frustration to the perception of the abdi-
cation of authority on the part of the USFS. 
The following quotation by one line officer 
aptly illustrates this point, but it also hints at 
the rationale for allowing such a practice: 
 
I think that there is bitterness here - 
there is a culture of experts in the For-
est Service and I think you’ll find some 
staff have attitudes that suggest we 
give too much to the [collaborative 
group], we give them too much power, 
we let them make our decisions. If I go 
ahead and make this one decision 
based on what the collaborative group 
wants, which may be different than 
what is on the CAAF, I will hear about 
it. There will be some employees who 
say that I caved in.  I tell a different 
story about that. I don’t consider it cav-
ing at all. I consider it an investment in 
something bigger than just that project.  
I will visit with the staff about that how 
they feel, but that is real difficult, es-
pecially when people go to school and 
learn how to do silviculture prescrip-
tions and do the right thing and then we 
come in and compromise their integ-
rity. As professionals, they see it that 
way sometimes. We are asking them to 
sell out on their profession for the [col-
laborative group]. 
 
These findings suggest that in the LMFRC 
and the MVFC, the power of authority re-
mains predominantly in the hands of the 
USFS. Evidence suggests that in the NFRC, 
however while no change is occurring in the 
organization’s regulatory authority, the 
agency is using its administrative discretion 
to negotiate its decision space to include the 
collaborative group in a substantial way. 
When the leadership accepts pressure from 
the collaborative group and effectively abdi-
cates some measure of power to the collabo-
rative group, agency personnel often become 
frustrated that their authority and expertise 
are questioned and often ignored. 
 
Power of Resources 
  
As Purdy (2012:410) notes, resources “in-
clude tangibles such as financial support, 
people, technology, and supplies; as well as 
intangibles such as knowledge, culture, and 
capabilities.” The acquisition and allocation 
of resources is a dynamic process and as 
such, the application of power stemming 
from resources is mutable. Interview partici-
pants from all three case studies mentioned 
the importance of resources. Sharing 
knowledge through the transfer of infor-
mation and data was the most commonly re-
ported resource mentioned by interviewees.  
 The USFS was founded on the prem-
ise that professional foresters, who had ob-
tained specific scientific training in forestry, 
would manage the nation’s trust forests 
(Kaufman 1960; Tipple and Wellman 1991). 
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Indeed, it is this professional knowledge and 
the culture of expertise that has placed the 
USFS in the position of having influence over 
the citizens who rely on the forests for com-
modity extraction, recreation, and ecosystem 
services.  In the participant arena, three USFS 
staff from the NFRC mentioned that sharing 
knowledge with the collaborative group con-
stituted much of the time and effort they put 
forth in the collaborative relationship and that 
they are sharing information and data that 
they would not ordinarily share with the pub-
lic. The level of information and data re-
quired by the collaborative group suggests 
that the non-agency members of the group are 
attempting to become experts in their own 
right. The NFRC then uses this knowledge to 
influence the decision-making process and as 
such, the USFS is conveying a portion of its 
power to the collaborative group in the 
NFRC. While two USFS staff members from 
the LMFRC and the MVFC noted that they 
do share information with their respective 
collaborative groups, comments by collabo-
rative group members such as, “the USFS are 
the experts, we rely on their expertise”, indi-
cate that the USFS continues to hold its 
power that is rooted in specialized knowledge 
in these two case studies. By retaining exper-
tise, the USFS keeps stakeholders from hav-
ing the ability to make well-informed de-
mands on the USFS, thereby restricting the 
influence of the stakeholders in the decision-
making process. 
 In the process arena, three partici-
pants from the LMFRC noted that the collab-
orative group has contributed to the funding 
available to the USFS for restoration projects 
through the stewardship contracting process. 
Briefly, stewardship contracting provides a 
mechanism for the USFS to work more 
closely with local communities by using ex-
isting funding to hire local contractors for 
forest management projects (Moseley and 
Davis 2010). Prior to its involvement with the 
collaborative group, the USFS did not fre-
quently use the stewardship contracting pro-
cess for restoration projects, due to, what one 
USFS staff member called, “internal barri-
ers.” These barriers included lack of support 
for stewardship contracting from those in ad-
ministrative positions. In this case, because 
the collaborative group expressed their desire 
to use stewardship contracting, the USFS be-
gan using it and was continuing to do so at 
the time this research was conducted. 
 Three participants from the NFRC 
also noted an increase in funding for projects 
owing to the collaborative relationship. Non-
agency members of the NFRC regularly 
lobby in Washington D.C., which has af-
fected local USFS budgets. According to one 
USFS line officer, “I would say the constitu-
ents of the NFRC have a large impact on what 
budgets and the amount we receive.”  
 In the content arena, one USFS staff 
member from the NFRC implied that the non-
agency collaborative group members con-
trolled the avenue of communication by re-
quiring meeting minutes to be approved by 
the non-agency members before they are dis-
tributed. In discussing his role in the collabo-
rative group the USFS staff member com-
mented, “presently, anytime we have a meet-
ing with them I am usually there to take notes 
and then I send out those notes to the NFRC 
for their approval.”  
 These findings suggest that 
knowledge is shared across all three case 
studies, but that the dependence by the col-
laborative group on the USFS to provide in-
formation that the agency would otherwise 
not share is most prevalent in the NFRC. The 
data also suggest that in the LMFRC and the 
NFRC, the USFS is benefiting from the col-
laborative governance arrangements by re-
ceiving increased funding. However, the 
mechanisms the collaborative groups use to 
obtain funding differ between the case stud-
ies. Finally, evidence from the NFRC sug-
gests that the non-agency members of the 
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group exert their power by controlling one 
source of communication via the approval 
and distribution of the meeting minutes.   
 
Power of Discursive Legitimacy 
 
 According to Purdy (2012), those 
wielding the power of discursive legitimacy 
can display domineering behavior that may 
restrict who has access to certain information 
or with whom and how the collaborative pro-
cess is discussed. Evidence of domineering 
behavior was found only in the NFRC and 
was mentioned by two participants. Falling in 
both the participation and content arenas, one 
USFS line officer noted that the agency and 
representatives from the timber and conser-
vation interests are paid for their work in the 
collaboration by the organizations they repre-
sent. In the case of the NFRC, we found the 
perception within the community that the fact 
that the timber industry and conservation in-
terests are paid allows the non-agency collab-
orative group members to dominate the direc-
tion of collaborative actions to that benefit 
only their limited interests. The NFRC has 
excluded other interests from joining the col-
laborative effort by its frequency and timing 
of meetings. As such, the interests repre-
sented by the paid members of the collabora-
tive group, representatives of the timber in-
dustry and conservation community, often 
take priority over the interests of other pub-
lics from the community.  
 In the process area, one line officer 
commented that because of the history of col-
laborative success and an on-going relation-
ship between the stakeholders and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, the non-agency members 
of the collaborative display an air of ‘right-
eousness’ when dealing with the USFS. The 
following quote by a USFS line officer de-
scribes how the collaborative group controls 
the collaborative conversation and some-
times displays domineering behavior.  
 
The conversation we have with [col-
laborative group] is often rooted in 
their ego. They think because they 
have all of this wonderful history, that 
they are world famous, and that the 
secretary of Agriculture talks to them 
– so USFS you need to do this our way 
because we’re great.  There’s this ego 
thing going on with this, I’m sorry, but 
it just isn’t flying well with me and I 
think that it’s potentially dangerous. I 
think that it keeps us stuck if we are not 
careful. They have every reason to be 
proud of their success, there is no ques-
tion about that, but when it is used to 
strong-arm us, something critical has 
to change in the way we relate to them. 
I want to honor the history of success 
and all the work that they did to come 
together, that is real and important, but 
I want to change the nature of the con-
versation and I just don’t know how to. 
 
Power of Trust 
 
Interwoven into the power dynamics of all 
collaborative relationships between the 
stakeholder groups and the USFS is the 
power of trust. Following the framework laid 
out by Smith et al. (2013) an individual’s 
trust in an agency is predicated on the belief 
that the agency shares an individual’s values 
and will act in a manner that results in the out-
comes that are important to the individual.  
Four USFS staff members from the NFRC 
noted that they spend a significant amount of 
time and effort in ‘justifying,’ to non-agency 
members of the group, their recommenda-
tions for specific management prescriptions. 
This finding suggests that mistrust exists be-
tween the agency and other stakeholders. The 
non-agency members of the collaborative 
group perceive that the agency’s priorities 
and values are not shared with them (Smith et 
al. 2013) or conversely, that they do not share 
the same values and expectations as the 
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agency.  
 One non-agency collaborative group 
member from the NFRC summarized this 
perception of the lack of alignment between 
stakeholder values and agency actions lead-
ing to a lack of trust with the USFS in the fol-
lowing comment.  
 
 Hopefully, the upcoming workshop 
will be similar to the one that we did 
years ago and it will have us all talking 
and building trust and relationships be-
cause we need that. A lot of things 
came up and we thought they would be 
addressed in this forest plan, but they 
weren’t. In fact, all the collaboration 
that had gone on, not only [collabora-
tive group], but a lot of other stake-
holders, was completely ignored in the 
proposed action for the forest plan. 
That was a reality check. It's like 
wow…we thought we were in the line 
with the Forest Service but really it 
doesn’t look like we are. 
 
In contrast, evidence was found in the 
LMFRC that a concerted effort on the part of 
the USFS to build trust with the collaborative 
is underway, and that the agency’s actions are 
in alignment with the priorities of the collab-
orative group. The following quote by one 
USFS staff member summarizes this prem-
ise.    
 
 We presented the data about the 
proposed project and basically asked 
[collaborative group] to consider this 
data in light of the actions that we’re 
proposing. And then we…we’re will-
ing to listen to their proposals. We took 
them seriously. For example, we know 
that road list is a significant issue. 
From the onset of the [proposed pro-
ject] we immediately got into dialogu-
ing and talking about the ROW [right 
of way] list so, there wasn’t a fight. We 
understood that we could still be effec-
tive with this project even if we 
couldn’t treat [remove trees] in the 
ROW list. And I also think that as a re-
sult of this coming together - one of my 
objectives was - that if we could build 
enough trust to get this one project 
through, anybody could judge us based 
on the product. And the idea was integ-
rity. We will do what we said we will 
do. We will not do what we said we 
won’t do. We will have integrity in this 
project.  
  
It is clear from these two disparate examples 
that trust is not necessarily a function of the 
length of time a group has collaborated with 
the USFS. The NFRC had been operational 
for more years than the LMFRC, yet there is 
an apparent lack of trust in the NFRC. Issues 
of the power of trust did not emerge from data 
collected from the MVFC. Within LMRRC 
and the MVFC, the collaborative groups have 
been able to avoid issues of trust through pro-
active and inclusive processes that include 
the USFS acting on collaborative agreements 
and sharing similar goals and values with 
stakeholders. In fact, one USFS staff member 
from the MVFC summed up his perception of 
the role of power, including trust, in the col-
laborative effort by saying, “there are no 
power struggles with this group.”  
 
Discussion  
 
The results from this study indicate that, for 
the three case studies examined herein, the 
power dynamics at play within the collabora-
tive governance arrangement include author-
ity, resources, discursive legitimacy, and 
trust. These powers, and the imbalance that 
sometimes result from their application, are 
representative of the underlying tensions that 
can be present in collaborative governance 
arrangements.  
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 At its best, collaborative governance 
can provide solutions to complex and conten-
tious natural resource problems through 
power-sharing arrangements (Cestero 1999; 
Dukes 2001; Scardina et al. 2007; Singleton 
2002). It can lead to positive changes in the 
organizational structure and processes of nat-
ural resource agencies and can result in get-
ting more on-the-ground work completed 
(Carr et al. 1998; Cheng and Burns 2007; 
Leach et al. 2002; Selin and Chevez 1995; 
Selin et al. 1997). Such is the case for the 
LMFRC and the MVFC. The USFS office in 
the LMFRC has seen an increase in their 
funding through the ability to use steward-
ship contracting for restoration projects, an 
organizational process not fully utilized by 
the USFS prior to its engagement with the 
collaborative group. Likewise, in the NFRC, 
the USFS noted that they had experienced an 
increase in funding through the lobbying ef-
forts of the collaborative group.  
 Our findings also suggest that the ap-
plication of power does not always lead to 
beneficial actions (Purdy 2012). In the case 
of the NFRC, when power imbalances occur, 
authority is challenged, frustrations arise, 
community and political relations are 
strained, stakeholders are excluded, and trust 
is difficult, if not impossible to maintain. In 
essence, the very factors that are required for 
an effective collaborative effort may be vio-
lated when one party within the collaborative 
network exerts their power in ways that give 
them advantage over other community inter-
ests (Cestero 1999; Cheng and Sturtevant 
2012; Gerlak et al.; Schuett et al. 2001; 
Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000). Previous 
studies that look at power in natural resource 
decision-making are often theoretical in na-
ture (Raik et al. 2008) or examine only a sin-
gle case study (Cook 2015; Purdy 2012). Our 
study is important in that it reveals that power 
is applied in varying ways between case stud-
ies resulting in different realized and poten-
tial consequences.  
 As mentioned above, power associ-
ated with resources, beyond financial ad-
vantages, plays a predominant role in the 
power dynamics between the agency and col-
laborative groups. The non-agency members 
of the collaborative groups in the LMFRC 
and the MVFC, acknowledge and accept the 
USFS position as experts. In the NFRC, how-
ever, non-agency members of the collabora-
tive group question the actions of agency per-
sonnel and are aiming to become experts in 
their own right. Assuming the old adage that 
knowledge is power, it would appear that the 
NFRC is seeking to accumulate power by ac-
quiring knowledge. However, contextual fac-
tors other than the quest for power could be 
driving the NFRC’s desire to obtain special-
ized information and knowledge. Applying 
Smith et al.’s (2012) framework, the requests 
for specialized information from the agency 
by the NFRC could stem from a concern that 
the agency does not share the same values 
and expectation of outcomes as the commu-
nity stakeholders. The storied history of the 
relationship between the agency and commu-
nity members is rife with conflict. During the 
Timber Wars, disputes over forest manage-
ment often resulted in intensively strained re-
lationships between the community and the 
USFS and the community experienced harsh 
economic downturns. While the collaborative 
effort between the USFS and the NFRC has 
resulted in a decrease in litigation and in-
creased funding for restoration projects, the 
wound from the aforementioned difficulties 
has not completely healed. The economy of 
the community in which the NFRC resides is 
still timber-dependent and as the largest em-
ployer in the community, is influential in the 
area. Many of the NFRC’s members are indi-
viduals who were involved in the earlier con-
flicts and their memory is long. Although the 
community that encompasses the LMFRC 
shares a similar, albeit less contentious his-
tory with the NFRC, the economy of the area 
is no longer dependent upon timber and many 
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of the timber operations in the area have 
closed. A desire on the part of the non-agency 
stakeholders to become ‘experts’ could also 
be driven by other contextual factors. Timber 
industry representatives make up a portion of 
non-agency stakeholders in the NFRC. A 
need to ensure that any treatments or plans 
that the USFS executes meet timber industry 
objectives could be a driving factor in the de-
sire of some stakeholders to fully understand 
USFS’s methodologies and the agency’s jus-
tifications of proposed actions. Even if the in-
itial motivation in obtaining specialized in-
formation is not to gain power, the result of 
doing so places the non-agency stakeholders 
in the position of having knowledge, with 
which they could exert power should they 
chose to do so. A limitation of our research is 
that we do not delve deeply into the anteced-
ents of the power relationships at play, espe-
cially from the community’s perspective. A 
future research direction that would prove 
useful to collaboration scholars and practi-
tioners alike is to elucidate the perceived mo-
tivations for the community stakeholder’s ac-
tions of information and data transfer.  
  An even more noteworthy finding of 
this study is that power is unlikely to be ap-
plied independently as some sources of 
power can be applied across more than one 
arena and the sources themselves can be in-
terwoven with other power sources. Such is 
the case of the role of trust and the application 
of power. It is apparent, in this study, that the 
USFS in the NFRC is transferring a measure 
of its decision-making power to the collabo-
rative group beyond what would typically be 
expected in a collaborative governance ar-
rangement. This was not found to be the case 
in the LMFRC and the MVFC.  
 In the NFRC, a tension between the 
power of authority and the power of trust re-
sults in struggles over discursive legitimacy 
across the arenas of participation, process de-
sign, and content. As Nie (2004) noted, the 
U.S. Congress sets up this power dynamic 
through its devolvement of oversight of the 
agencies through the public involvement 
mandate. It is through the community-level 
collaboration that the power dynamic is man-
ifested and the consequences are played out. 
We see this reflected in the actions of a line 
officer in the MVFC who asserts the USFS’s 
authority by drawing a line in the sand when 
it comes to decision-making, thereby making 
the collaboration process more closely re-
semble the traditional public involvement 
process. The NFRC, however, presents a very 
different story. Even though the USFS pos-
sesses authoritative power, a lack of trust by 
stakeholders, as seen in the NFRC, can un-
dermine that power and open the space for 
contests over participation, process, agendas, 
and management actions. The consequence 
of this tension is that the USFS personnel can 
feel that their expertise and credibility are be-
ing threatened, and they react with negativity 
and resistance to the collaborative effort that 
only further increase the tension. In the 
NFRC, even though there was some USFS 
staff resistance at first, line officers seemed 
open to the collaborative group’s involve-
ment in defining management goals and ac-
tions, and the stakeholders themselves placed 
trust in the USFS. However, the collaborative 
group, because of its narrow stakeholder rep-
resentation, has continued to exert its power 
across boundaries and into areas that have 
heretofore been the purview of agency per-
sonnel. It should be noted, however, that Ru-
deen et al. (2012) found that a full represen-
tation of interests in a collaborative effort did 
not guarantee the avoidance of tensions over 
power. Future research that further examines 
the relationship between stakeholder repre-
sentation and power relationships would im-
prove the understanding and practice of col-
laboration in natural resource management.  
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Conclusion 
 
An intricate and dynamic process of jockey-
ing for power and negotiating decision space 
between the USFS and community stake-
holders plays out in the collaborative govern-
ance of federal forests in the post-Timber 
War American West. The level of trust be-
tween the stakeholders and the agency, and in 
particular, the level of shared values and the 
perception of the alignment of agency goals 
and actions with the desires and expectations 
of the collaborative group are key compo-
nents of how power is distributed within the 
collaborative relationship. As collaboration 
becomes increasingly institutionalized as a 
favored policy tool to address federal forest 
management challenges, it is increasingly 
likely that power dynamics will intensify 
(Schultz; Jedd and Beam 2012). This places 
a high burden on collaboration conveners and 
facilitators to develop and sustain the capac-
ity to address power dynamics through struc-
tured, transparent, and accountable pro-
cesses. In turn, this necessitates an invest-
ment in collaborative capacity to match the 
high expectations placed on locally-based 
collaboration to address the complex and 
still-contentious issues facing federal forests.   
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